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Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do youknow him under the name of Rubenstein?

Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your time on?

Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican Republic [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. And then --

Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1967.

And after that I returned to Washington and became the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

In 1970 I went to Rio de Janiero [redacted] And in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to Brasilia from Rio de Janiero.

In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station. And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of the then Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until

or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually assassinate some one.

Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency talk that way?

Mr. Phillips. Under traumatic conditions I have heard human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were bumped off or something.

But I have never heard two officers sit down and seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line and say almost anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifically a Major Marshall, [redacted] that they intended to assassinate Allende?

Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall, Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through Colonel Wimert, whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could accomplish it, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.

mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to help accomplish the kidnapping?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Valenzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. That is ture.

Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them specifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was -- the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin America.

And they said something about, their own arms could be identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified. I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

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Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we establish what I called a false flag base of people that would go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable -- is this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that he asked for it after I came over.

Mr. Treverton. It is not.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is relatively simple.

This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970, and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the purposes of setting up the false flag office --

Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.

Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican".

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. Continue:

"Having at least one key Brazilian and one key Argentinian would be vital, and we have candidates."

And you did that.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any Chilean."

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr.Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall, that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II activities?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have candidates who can successfully pose as Brazilian intelligence officers." You did that, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil would be blamed if something went wrong.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me,

because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazilian foreign service officer. However, that was it. It was a devious move. It was the final result -- the idea being that if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying, why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets, is not true.

But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that was the idea.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go to their death swearing they were [redacted] or whatever?

Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic, Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And I briefed them,and I think what I said to them was, this is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble.

And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help you.

So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the [redacted] that you were sending someone down to pose as a [redacted], and his instructions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose

as a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached?

Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest dreams to do that.

Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between continuing intelligence services were things that were very important to preserve, and that we had very close and delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a man the Brazilians would be quite unhappy with us. But I thought that was better than letting the world know that was a U.S. Citizen down there.

Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27 to say this:

"Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations securely."

So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services -- not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence

service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the Soviets, from us, or from the Brazilians.

So, it is not an unusual practice.

Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was Chile.

And then you said what the other one was. What was that?

Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs of Station course, which is a training course for people who are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.

When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there as the Chief of Station. And I just wasn't sure that I wanted to be associated with something like that. But I decided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is doing, I will go -- I am going to go along. So, I did go along.

Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassinations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could understand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.

Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32 years beforehe was elected.

Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ardent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that we had a visit from a man who had the code name of [redacted] he was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send 22,000 rather than 400.

So, I can understand why they thought this was going, in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our interests. But that is an assumption.

It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The difference was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are going to have to use violence.

I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said,

activities?

Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was the Station Chief in Rio de Janiero in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

Senator MOndale. Now, in that position you familiarized yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on, and tried to become as expert as you could in the political forces and so on?

Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator, one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he was pursuing, is that correct?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but he indeed acted that way.

Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pursuing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with the population support under constitutional system?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

Senator Mondale. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection

assignment by the President and by the White House?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game. The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the word.

And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

I call your attention in our briefing books to what is Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author of that cable?

Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating officer, yes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know the situation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess is what I am after.

Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by

putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is the one that accepts the responsibility.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the following sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes on the stars.

What does that mean in Agency talk?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye, however.

Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed a joint venture, I can promise that that was Dino Poinzio's contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I am not sure what it means even now.

SEnator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the assassination of Schneider was something which presented the opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have done.

Do you agree with me?

Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finished. Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred, Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as Marshall, immediately said,this is it, that is enough. There was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America that would have been the signal for further action, weakness, and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the business.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activities which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that one of the assignments that [redacted] had?

Mr. Phillips. Wimert? Yes, I believe it was Colonel Wimert that was in touch with that group.

Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem, didn't they?

Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams?

Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team and Colonel Wimert.

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have been some central direction from the office or from headquarters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had the slightest idea that Colonel Wimert was working with us. And I don't believe that Colonel Wimert -- I don't know that Colonel Wimert knew about them.

So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of direction from the Station.

Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand the Viaux group?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here, counsel?

Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interruptible.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one of the Valenzuela group's plan?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically. Obviously when the guns were passed [redacted] and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we read the press reports that General Schneider died from hand-gun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly the Valenzuela group using those guns.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to abduct General Schneider?

Mr. PHillips. I don't recall. There may very well have been, but I am not real sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which is the relationship [redacted]. If there are any questions on the relationship between the two groups.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with [redacted] and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be

carried out on October 19. [redacted] witting of the above plan, has promised to keep the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly involved."

What do you think "not directly involved" refers to? Why not just not involved?

Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin that works with some group type of thing.

And I believe that it must refer to that.

Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual cable in the Senator's books?

Mr. Inderfurther. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that paragraph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19 October on the subject of General Viaux:

"General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week."

Now, I can't read that language any way other than meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear -- would be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved. And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that way.

Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more than just the statement?

Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.

Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to --

Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was [redacted]

Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

As for the narrow part of your question, by all means it is a bad way to do business.

Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the document Tab A.

It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 September, "Subject, Genesis of Project".

Incidentally, what was the code name for this project? Was it FU Belt?

Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two.

Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stnd for anything in particular?

Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would be a lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt means Chile. Belt means nothing.

Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these names?

Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated. And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes out in those things.

Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call

it pixie-like.

Mr. Phillips. But many times the cryptonums mean absolutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.

Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good ones.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

"The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned -- he was instructed to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell

his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the defense attache system down there?

Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army, and then there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there was a boss?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Wimert was told not to tell that boss?

Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?

Mr. Phillips. I believe the explanation for that was the fact that Colonel Wimert had been around Latin America, spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he developed really marvelous relationships with the military of officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take advantage of the one man in Chile that they liked the most, trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural for him to spend his weekends with these people.

Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset. But how was it arranged that he would work for the CIA, and lay that question against the instruction from President Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did

you accomplish it?

Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book that has been signed by General Philpott which was a message to [redacted] saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott, I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott ?

Mr. Phillips. I never did.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr. Broe, Mr. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been left back in the shop, sort of, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

Mr. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Philpott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our building. I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?

Mr. Phillips. It is.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.

Did you make that change?

Mr. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said Bennett. I think the signature on the original document was from Philpott. But that is my change there.

Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page -- the sentence reads:

"Do not allow Colonel Wimert to retain copy of this message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that General Bennett is out of the country".

Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make those changes?

Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed something that is written out, and there is no secretary, and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that. On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask

the communicators to send that, and youwill then later write for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable. I am not sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Bennett's name and not General Philpott's name?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had been the case that not only would the change have been made, but there would have been some sort of note on the side or something. So, I believe that the original must have said Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.

Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the first page used Bennett's name, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the "suggested message to be sent to Army attache from General Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennetts'.

Mr. PHillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3 that has Mr. Philpott's signature?

Mr. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would

wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct Wimert to work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence Agency further brought into the operation which we have been calling Track II?

Mr. PHillips. My answer to that until a few minutes ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document since then that indicates that someone else was talked to later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message.But until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have said, I think that Philpott was the man.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on that one occasion?

Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion. But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little room with windows, and so there were other people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. And this is a cable releasing officer Willia Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated October 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA. And it says:

"Please deliver the following message ('destroy immediately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett. "

Now, on what basis did you authenticate that message which purports to be to Colonel Wimert from Lieutenant General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because I presume in this case -- I am sure in this case once again there was a document that was handed to me and I was told, send this down. In order to make this point, I was in there, and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on. If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority to authenticate, and I didn't necesarily turn to them and say, hey --

Mr Schwarz. Prove that --

Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.

Mr. Schwarz. Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated docu-

ment headed "Destroy immediately" from LTG Bennett to Colonel Wimert "Eyes only".

(The document referred to was Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from LTG Bennett [redacted], and has the text in it which you sent on [redacted].

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to who handed you that document?

Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that. There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the office and say, here is something to send. There were others which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow forwarding slip on it. There are times,I am sure, when I would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the way, send this.

I simply cannot recall the circumstances in which someone handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying less attention to those things, because I was in effect the postman for people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection at all about this document?

Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on that document?

Mr. PHillips. Well, it certainly looks like the signature which was on the other document which was said to be Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

military attache. And those instructions went down. Apparently it would appear that theremight be something here where they are going to bring in more people, as is known to several persons, it says down here.

And itmay have been because there was an attempt there not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk to you about something we are doing that we have kind of already done. That is theonly thing I can come up with. I can't give you a better explanation than that.

Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling and strange document?

Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be more helpful on this. But I was treating these -- these things were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

Mr. Schwarz. That is an explanation that deals with some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating officer.

And second, this is not simply taking some other message and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling,

and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when you have further testimony on this to help me job my memory. I can't remember the rationale for this.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.

Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will confuse [redacted]".

It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would have confused him.

"Background for his information: both Generals Bennett and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".

Who told you that?

Mr. PHillips. I don't know for sure, but I presume this must have been Bill Broe.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling you that?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. But I don't think that I -- I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words, that is hthe kind of cable that I wouldn't have released just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing. This cable I think must have originated either with a discussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word, write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say, do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it

here -- is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone else that was working in my shop, [redacted], or someone else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing something else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said, here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things. So I really can't remember.

Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes out?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at night.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

Mr. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

Mr. Phillips. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. -- in the customary place for the time.

Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy.

The point I am trying to make is, if Mr. Broe were leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well

and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use Colonel Wimert down there, he is really important to us, and that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the only explanation I can give.

Mr. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new interested parties and the several persons referred to in the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority than Bennett and Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just -- this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem logical to me that they would start going outside and down, I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I only assume that.

Mr.Schwarz. You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. I understand.

Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using Wimert, and knew some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Or outside the Defense Department, but very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an interest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction

of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing the work for the CIA [redacted]

Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety daily events, were they?

Mr. Phillips. They were not.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it was necessarily because General Philpott would have been embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

But this rather unusual step was made because of the talents of the military men, to bring him into a program that you weren't even talking with the State Department about. And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things that I obviously had something to do with.

But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job, and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when someone would come in and say, we want something to go down to Wimert, and it has something to do with General Philpott, I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had been one of our operations.

Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2

there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse [redacted] Background for his information".

Now, there are two ways in which those words "for his information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine background.

The other is that it is a story to be given [redacted] for his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way doyou read it if you do not know what the facts are?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent of falsehood in putting something down like that.

So, I assume that it is really for his background of what happened.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got the information which you provided in this cable?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful after you talk to others. But I simply do not.

Mr. Schwarz. The last paragraphs make the notation "that we must advise GEneral Bennett time when [redacted] shown" the telegram which is Exhibit 3.

Did you advise General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't know that it was.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is the tab at which the reply from Wimert is located? Is it K?

Mr. Treverton. K, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit 8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant General Bennett from Colonel Wimert".

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come from Colonel Wimert and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an info copy and this, that and the other.

The action on this cable would have certainly have gone at least to Mr.Broe, and possibly higher, because it says, this is his message to the head of another government service. And so it would have gone to that level.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a cable will come in and there will be more than one copy. And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and then you get the information copy, and so forth.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable whether there would have been more than one copy?

Mr. Phillips. There is no indicator to say who it went to.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the "eyes only" have any significance to you in the third line?

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what Colonel [redacted] was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Department, but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else other than General Bennett.

Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I do not know.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?

Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been highly unusual for a message to come in from overseas saying, give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.

Mr. Schwarz. What would be the normal form of its delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?

Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes through a communications channel, it means that they are going to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying, will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

Mr. Schwarz. This message states:

"Please deliver the following message, ('destroy immediately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett." And the message was: "For your information suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".

What are MAP and FMS.

Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.

Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?

Mr. Phillips. That is probably it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?

Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not, repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date of situation".

Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?

Mr. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.

Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?

Mr. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

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Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to do with that, do they?

Mr. Phillips. I would gather from this message that it is simply an explanation from -- it says General Bennett [redacted], to explain something. As a part of Track I, and the whole business, all of these different options were being looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with military things because it looks like Allende is going to get in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for [redacted] to give him some rationale behind it when he was down there running away trying to foment the coup, saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this government?

I am speculating. But this was another one of those messages quote unquote which went in our channels.

Mr. Schwarz. Who gave you this message?

Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.

Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?

Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved, and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me or how it arrived.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be another document which contains the purported message from

Mr. Fenn. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Talking about telephones, incidentally, was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it down there --a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I realize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that the approach we are making to this?

Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach. He has denied any knowledge of this.

Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

Mr. PHillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand why. Because the messages went from Philpott [redacted] And [redacted] said, I am with you 100 percent, and from

that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy on his part about doing what he was doing.

And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's side, not having been involved with him.

From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that someone is using that business that I referred to in dispatches, General Bennett says, when they are really talking about what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that is conceivable.

But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.

Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see a motive?

Mr. Phillips. Precisely.

I can't see the motive for fooling Colonel Wimert, because Colonel Wimert had already started working when he received the instructions from the number two man in his Agency, which is indeed pretty high up.

So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful is that I, too, am confused.

Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October 14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

Senator Schweiker. Let me ask counsel this.

Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --

Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday. We have talked to him. He accepts at least one message. There are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not sure if he accepted two.

Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?

Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.

Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while, as we said previously, things had fallen into place according to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very, very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.

And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few of us, probably myself and Mr. Pionzio and Mr. Broe and Mr. Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but I do remember thatmeeting going up there and saying, if there ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that meeting.

what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool, and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days to die.

Miss Culbreth. You had served as Chief of Station in the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in this position on the Track II party?

Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement. U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly nation", relations were very bad.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. It certainly was not. And I do not do that now.

Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize his death as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that

when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing around his car he drew his gun.

Miss Culbreth. Thank you.

I would like to direct your attention to this cable that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated September27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by 10 October".

And you were questioned about this part: "These officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any Chilean. An example: We have a Canadian who can pose as Brazilian intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a Brazilian one".

In the second paragraph which was not read earlier, I would like to read this and then put a question to you:

"Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give station great flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations securely".

To me this second paragraph indicates that these false flag officers were people that had experience in this very kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me personally and had worked for me.

Miss Culbreth. And had been in this kind of capacity as a false flag officer?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Miss Culbreth. So, this was not some unique and unusual, devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this instance?

Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, especially the second paragraph that you read, was -- the immediate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on, that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what are you talking about, this, that and the other.

As a matter of fact, as I recall, [redacted] was terribly upset, because he is a sort of an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words, to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the station that we had been given this job to do and that we at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to accomplish the job that they had been given with the least possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that sort of thing.

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Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think

in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even though this says, probably by General Viaux and so forth.

Miss Culbreth. Was there any question in your mind as principal operating officer here in the states that there was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really regard them as separate groups?

Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else. But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups, and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

And then we had the other group which seemed to be more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping operations when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up on these.

With regard to the information that was given to you, the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the Chief of Station and were directed to Colonel Wimert, who can

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Senator Hart of Michigan. Anyone else?

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. How large was the room you were operating out of? You described it as a small windowless room.

Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there -- no, not that big.

Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the Task Force?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force besides you?

Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries, there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing. There were two or three secretaries, myself, Mr. [redacted] six, eight, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. How many action officers were in the room?

Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much [redacted] and myself, as the real action officers. And then there were two junior officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And there was someone from the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five officers that I recall. And I think that there was a 6th that